
Peter Mandelson recently said he thought talks on UK re-entry to the EU could start in 10 years. He identified some of the things that would need to happen to make this possible, including a significant improvement in the UK economy, and a restoration of trust between the UK and the EU. The second of these would require better conduct of diplomacy on the UK side. This estimate (as he pointed out) is somewhat in advance of Starmer’s recent statement that rejoin will not happen in his lifetime (he is 62). But then, Mandelson can say what he really thinks.
I want to take Mandelson as my starting point and consider the 10-year frame for rejoin. Clearly he is right about the UK economy. Investment and productivity need to improve significantly for the UK to be seen as a potential asset to the EU. Starmer’s government sees economic progress as a two-term job, and that means ten years. And there’s no guarantee that it will be achieved. Much depends on outside factors. But the recent Draghi report on the Eurozone economy must likewise have impacted the confidence of the EU’s leadership, presenting as it does a comparable economic challenge for the EU. There are similarities between the problems of the EU and the UK, particularly with regard to lack of investment in potential growth areas. An EU that feels economically vulnerable will likely be pessimistic about the prospects of readmitting a similarly vulnerable UK economy.
On the other hand, the UK is a military power- particularly a naval power- on Europe’s doorstep, and in an increasingly insecure world, the EU might see it as desirable to have the UK back in the fold, despite economic weakness, because of that naval power. More of that below.
We already know that either way, more ground needs to be made up in the EU/UK relationship because of the pattern of hostility and bad faith that UK conservative governments have pursued against the EU since 2016. That pattern needs to be broken by Starmer and Lammy in an unambiguous way, and a relationship of trust and mutual esteem needs to be established. Work on this has started, but the UK’s attitude – Starmer’s attitude, specifically – is ambiguous and inconsistent. Progress on Youth Mobility would be a building-block of trust, and that could be progressed substantially in five years, let alone ten.
However, internal politics holds these processes to ransom on both sides of the channel. I shall focus on the right wing of politics in both cases, as the political centre and left are generally well-disposed to UK rejoin, so much depends on the direction of travel on the right wing, both in the UK and in the EU. In the EU the far right is prospering, and is likely to become more influential in coming months and years. They are characterized by varying degrees of Euroscepticism, some of which (eg Meloni) seem to be contingent and accommodatable, others of which (eg AfD) look more dangerous. What happens to these movements over the next ten years is crucial to the EUs prospects, and to the UK’s prospects of reconnecting. The European far right could break up the EU, or they could make it their own.
The right wing in the UK is, at present, almost entirely pro- Brexit and anti-EU, at least in public. The Conservative Party is both those things, and Reform even more so. Could this change over the next decade? At present the prospects look poor. Reform, which appears to have considerable growth potential, exists primarily as an ethnic nationalist, anti-foreigner party. Their agenda is to cast the EU as an enemy, alongside immigrants. The Conservative parliamentary party has been purged of overt remainers, and at present no Tory MP dares to express any positive views about Europe (Peers are a slightly different matter). Tory membership in the country has always been Eurosceptic.
So what might change on the UK right? The only real hope must lie in the passage of time. The present generation of leaders will be on their way out in ten years, and we don’t know who will succeed them. We don’t know which way thinking will go in the younger reaches of the Conservative party. Witch-hunts tend to run out of steam after a few years, and people become weary of the resulting polarization. Also we don’t know what kind of nationalism will dominate the right wing of the party ten years from now. If its civic nationalism, that would at least allow right-wing Tories to be a little friendlier to neighbouring countries with similar institutions to ours. If its ethnic nationalism, no foreigner is to be trusted. As for the conservative party membership, the grim reaper will dispose of many of those, given their age profile. But there is no guarantee that they won’t simply be replaced by slightly younger members of a similar ilk.
The other great imponderable is the direction of travel in the rest of the world. US politics took a change of direction in 2016 and shows no sign of reverting to what we would once have called ‘normality’. If Trump wins, his administration will have little interest in the UK, considerable hostility to the EU, and deep ambivalence toward NATO. If he is succeeded by Vance, that is likely to continue for most of the ten-year period. If Trump pulls the US out of NATO, the UK will be in sore need of allies nearby, and will in any case need to give priority to the security of Europe. As one of the more significant military powers in Europe its relative importance would inevitably grow, drawing it into a closer involvement with its EU neighbours; unless it consciously chooses an isolationist future.
If Harris wins, the US position will be more like the present one, which involves an ongoing pivot away from Europe and toward the Pacific. So the drift of America away from Europe and NATO will be slower. A Harris administration is also more likely to want to recreate the pre-brexit situation where the UK acted as a bridge between the US and the EU. The logical implication of that is that she would be predisposed to encourage closer links between the UK and Europe. Its not clear what priority that would have for her, but it would be a nudge in the right direction.
What about the rest of the world? Russia is unlikely to get any friendlier after Putin. Probably it will continue to threaten Europe, and try to undermine the EU by adopting disruptive proxies such as Orban. China is being wooed by Starmer and Reeves now, as a source of investment into the UK, and that may progress into a better relationship. But it is not clear whether the Chinese see any advantage for themselves in either keeping the UK out of the EU, or pushing it toward rejoining. Either way the EU is a more important trading partner for China than is the UK, and a workable relationship with the EU is probably a higher priority for them. If China decides to take a clear stance regarding the UK rejoining the EU, their overal weight and influence in the world may make that a significant factor in the process.
I have assumed so far that the EU will remain in a ‘steady state’ over the next ten years, so that we can plan and predict around it. Almost certainly that assumption is wrong. I have mentioned the need for action to improve economic performance, and that is imperative if the EU is to remain stable. But forces other than the financial are at work also in the EU – social, cultural and political – and these may produce important changes in the next ten years. These may offer opportunities for the UK in its relations with the EU, but it will be just as likely to present challenges. That’s a bigger subject, for another time.
So all in all Peter Mandelson looks rather optimistic in his ten-year projection. But his experience of politics and diplomacy, particularly around the UK and the EU, is unrivalled, and he has proved an astute observer and operator over many years. He has much experience of how things can change, and of what changes can realistically be achieved. Last but not least, he will certainly be fully aware of all the potential problems that I have outlined here. But he is still optimistic. Well, optimists often achieve more than pessimists. We should take him seriously.
Stephen Wilmot