Several recent news items suggest that progress is being made toward a deeper rapprochement with the EU. Most notably, the UK is back in the EU’s Erasmus + scheme, meaning that British students will be able to attend universities in the EU, and vice versa for EU students to the UK. So the upcoming British generation of young adults are having something of their European heritage returned to them at last. The importance of that move can be gauged from the vituperative response of the daily Telegraph and the Daily Mail to those developments.
It looks as if there is also diplomatic progress on Youth Mobility. Less tangible, but equally important, we seem to be seeing slow shifts in thinking within the Labour Party. That showed through in recent remarks by David Lammy. If something like this rate can be maintained through till 2029, we can hope for some real movement. It has felt glacially slow at times. But even at that pace a lot can happen in three and a half years.
So what will happen to all that progress if Reform win in 2029. The odds for that happening seem not to be changing much as time passes. Things will almost certainly get tighter as we approach the election, but Reform are starting from an exceptionally strong position in the polls. So we need to plan for a Reform government in 2029.
Reform may reverse all progress that has been achieved, and distance us again from the EU, at least as much as Johnson and Frost did in 2020, and perhaps more. That would fit their declared programme. But we can’t just wait for the worst. It may be possible to salvage something of these gains through a campaign to mobilize support for them among those who stand to lose most by their cancellation. Links that offer a clearly arguable economic advantage would be the best choice in the long run, but by 2029 they won’t have had much impact, or gained many friends among the general public. Culturally-oriented links such as Erasmus and Youth Mobility might be worth a fight however. Certainly for Erasmus there may be a student constituency by 2029 who had high hopes of study abroad, and would be vocally unhappy about having that snatched away. But also those programmes may not produce too much hostility from most Reform people. Free movement is the real hate; and that particular can will need to be kicked further down the road.
The context is changing in other ways. By 2029 Europe might start to look a little different, and a little more congenial to some Reform people. We may well get Bardella in the Elysee Palace in 2027, for instance. It will be a challenge for British rejoiners to adjust to that, but it might also be an incentive for Reform to get a little closer to France. Bardella is a Eurosceptic but he isn’t a Frexiter, and according to Steve Anglesey in the New World Newsletter on December 11th, he has expressed some favourable views about the UK going back into the EU. There might be an interesting angle there for Farage who has just had an (apparently) friendly meeting with Bardella. The prospect of a more right-wing Europe was discussed in this blog in July 2024 and the challenge remains. The Bardella model of the EU is likely to be very different from the present arrangements, and much less congenial. But still, its better than the AfD version, which wants Germany out of the EU completely.
What if we look westward, away from Europe? In times past the UK’s close relationships worked in two directions, Our friends in Europe and our friends in the US could compensate one another to some degree, so a cooling on one side might be balanced by a warming on the other. However, the US, though technically perhaps still an ally, is certainly no longer a friend. Trump and his administration are hostile to the UK in all but military terms, as they are to the rest of Europe. The sentiments expressed by Vice-President Vance’s in his speech in February 2025 have now solidified into a policy agenda for the Trump administration through their recently-published National Security Strategy. The section on Europe is fairly short (its a world overview) and its very hostile; intensely hostile to supranational bodies such as the EU; and to migration; and to cultural change. The policy document expresses a clear intention to interfere in Europe’s affairs, support nationalist parties and break up the EU.
What that implies for the UK is not entirely clear, but it looks very likely that Trump will make considerable efforts to prevent the UK from getting closer to the EU. Its easy to imagine a scenario in the minds of Trump’s team where the rest of Europe falls into the Russian sphere of influence, partly through electoral politics (think AfD) partly through military intimidation; while the UK (and perhaps Ireland) fall into the US sphere, again partly through electoral politics (think Reform) partly through economic intimidation.
This is not an attractive prospect. If The EU and the UK reject the Trump prescription, they are going to find themselves caught between two hostile powers, one east, one west, both far more militarized and aggressive than Europe. It is not going to be comfortable for us in the UK to be part of that squeezed middle. But we need to consider the alternatives. The US and Russia don’t want allies, they want puppets and patsies. Likewise China. That is something we should all be thinking about. Bardella and Farage no doubt see Putin and Trump as very useful in their present campaigning. But after 2027 and 2029 respectively (assuming they are in power) they will need to think hard about what friends and allies they really need. So shall we all.

