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Peter Mandelson recently said he thought talks on UK re-entry to the EU could start in 10 years. He identified some of the things that would need to happen to make this possible, including a significant improvement in the UK economy, and a restoration of trust between the UK and the EU. The second of these would require better conduct of diplomacy on the UK side. This estimate (as he pointed out) is somewhat in advance of Starmer’s recent statement that rejoin will not happen in his lifetime (he is 62). But then, Mandelson can say what he really thinks.

I want to take Mandelson as my starting point and consider the 10-year frame for rejoin. Clearly he is right about the UK economy. Investment and productivity need to improve significantly for the UK to be seen as a potential asset to the EU. Starmer’s government sees economic progress as a two-term job, and that means ten years. And there’s no guarantee that it will be achieved.  Much depends on outside factors. But the recent Draghi report on the Eurozone economy must likewise have impacted the confidence of the EU’s leadership, presenting as it does a comparable economic challenge for the EU. There are similarities between the problems of the EU and the UK, particularly with regard to lack of investment in potential growth areas. An EU that feels economically vulnerable will likely be pessimistic about the prospects of readmitting a similarly vulnerable UK economy.

On the other hand, the UK is a military power- particularly a naval power- on Europe’s doorstep, and in an increasingly insecure world, the EU might see it as desirable to have the UK back in the fold, despite economic weakness, because of that naval power.  More of that below.

We already know that either way, more ground needs to be made up in the EU/UK relationship because of the pattern of hostility and  bad faith that UK conservative governments have pursued against the EU since 2016. That pattern needs to be broken by Starmer and Lammy in an unambiguous way, and a relationship of trust and mutual esteem needs to be established. Work on this has started, but the UK’s attitude – Starmer’s attitude, specifically – is ambiguous and inconsistent. Progress on Youth Mobility would be a building-block of trust, and that could be progressed substantially in five years, let alone ten.

However, internal politics holds these processes to ransom on both sides of the channel. I shall focus on the right wing of politics in both cases, as the political centre and left are generally well-disposed to UK rejoin, so much depends on the direction of travel on the right wing, both in the UK and in the EU. In the EU the far right is prospering, and is likely to become more influential in coming months and years. They are characterized by varying degrees of Euroscepticism, some of which (eg  Meloni) seem to be contingent and accommodatable, others of which (eg AfD) look more dangerous. What happens to these movements over the next ten years is crucial to the EUs prospects, and to the UK’s prospects of reconnecting. The European far right could break up the EU, or they could make it their own.  

The right wing in the UK is, at present, almost entirely pro- Brexit and anti-EU, at least in public. The Conservative Party is both those things, and Reform even more so. Could this change over the next decade? At present the prospects look poor.  Reform, which appears to have considerable growth potential, exists primarily as an ethnic nationalist, anti-foreigner party.  Their agenda is to cast the EU as an enemy, alongside immigrants. The Conservative parliamentary party has been purged of overt remainers, and at present no Tory MP dares to express any positive views about Europe (Peers are a slightly different matter). Tory membership in the country has always been Eurosceptic. 

So what might change on the UK right? The only real hope must lie in the passage of time. The present generation of leaders will be on their way out in ten years, and we don’t know who will succeed them. We don’t know which way thinking will go in the younger reaches of the Conservative party. Witch-hunts tend to run out of steam after a few years, and people become weary of the resulting polarization. Also we don’t know what kind of nationalism will dominate the right wing of the party ten years from now. If its civic nationalism, that would at least allow right-wing Tories to be a little friendlier to neighbouring countries with similar institutions to ours. If its ethnic nationalism, no foreigner is to be trusted. As for the conservative party membership, the grim reaper will dispose of many of those, given their age profile. But there is no guarantee that they won’t simply be replaced by slightly younger members of a similar ilk.

The other great imponderable is the direction of travel in the rest of the world. US politics took a change of direction in 2016 and shows no sign of reverting to what we would once have called ‘normality’. If Trump wins, his administration will have little interest in the UK, considerable hostility to the EU, and deep ambivalence toward NATO. If he is succeeded by Vance, that is likely to continue for most of the ten-year period.  If Trump pulls the US out of NATO, the UK will be in sore need of allies nearby, and will in any case need to give priority to the security of Europe. As one of the more significant military powers in Europe its relative importance would inevitably grow, drawing it into a closer involvement with its EU neighbours; unless it consciously chooses an isolationist future.

 If Harris wins, the US position will be more like the present one, which involves an ongoing pivot away from Europe and toward the Pacific. So the drift of America away from Europe and NATO will be slower. A Harris administration is also more likely to want to recreate the pre-brexit situation where the UK acted as a bridge between the US and the EU. The logical implication of that is that she would be predisposed to encourage closer links between the UK and Europe. Its not clear what priority that would have for her, but it would be a nudge in the right direction.

What about the rest of the world? Russia is unlikely to get any friendlier after Putin. Probably it will continue to threaten Europe, and try to undermine the EU by adopting disruptive proxies such as Orban. China is being wooed by Starmer and Reeves now, as a source of investment into the UK, and that may progress into a better relationship. But it is not clear whether the Chinese see any advantage for themselves in either keeping the UK out of the EU, or pushing it toward rejoining. Either way the EU is a more important trading partner for China than is the UK, and a workable relationship with the EU is probably a higher priority for them. If China decides to take a clear stance regarding the UK rejoining the EU, their overal weight and influence in the world may make that a significant factor in the process.  

I have assumed so far that the EU will remain in a ‘steady state’ over the next ten years, so that we can plan and predict around it. Almost certainly that assumption is wrong. I have mentioned the need for action to improve economic performance, and that is imperative if the EU is to remain stable. But forces other than the financial are at work also in the EU – social, cultural and political – and these may produce important changes in the next ten years. These may offer opportunities for the UK in its relations with the EU, but it will be just as likely to present challenges. That’s a bigger subject, for another time.

So all in all Peter Mandelson looks rather optimistic in his ten-year projection. But his experience of politics and diplomacy, particularly around the UK and the EU, is unrivalled, and he has proved an astute observer and operator over many years. He has much experience of how things can change, and of what changes can realistically be achieved. Last but not least, he will certainly be fully aware of all the potential problems that I have outlined here. But he is still optimistic. Well, optimists often achieve more than pessimists. We should take him seriously.

Stephen Wilmot

Aston University’s Centre for Business Prosperity have analysed the monthly trading figures between the UK and the EU since 2021.  Their finding is that the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, negotiated by the Johnson government, has had a negative effect on UK-EU trade. They use the term ‘stifling’.

It shows a 27% drop in UK exports to, and a 32% reduction in imports from, the EU.  It also shows a 33% decrease in the variety of products exported from the UK.

The implications of this for the UK’s economy are clear; and bad. Its one of the most damning pieces of data on the effects of Brexit so far. I guess it won’t be the last.

More information, plus a PDF of the report itself, is on the Aston University website:

https://www.aston.ac.uk/research/bss/research-centres/business-prosperity/unbound

Rejoiners can only feel hopeful about Keir Starmer’s quest for a closer relationship with Germany. Still the economic powerhouse of the EU despite its present travails, Germany’s goodwill toward the UK will be crucial in creating a closer economic relationship with the EU as a whole. All this is moving in the right direction.  

So why was he (or rather his news-management machine) making such a song and dance about not agreeing to Youth Free Movement and not rejoining Erasmus? That looks like mixed messages.

Steve Anglesey in ’The Rejoinder’ (Aug 29) suggests a three-part explanation for this behaviour. First, Youth Free Movement and Erasmus look too much like the dreaded  freedom of movement, and we know that immigration is at the top of the British public’s list of anxieties at the moment.

Second, he doesn’t trust the apparent shift in public opinion about Brexit. Anglesey doesn’t say this explicitly, but I guess we might suppose that Starmer suspects the opinion shift against Brexit is shallow and unreliable; not a firm basis for political action. And he may well be right.  In the light of both of those considerations he chooses to hold off risking a ‘betrayal’ backlash, waiting (Anglesey suspects) until the Tories have a new leader, and are fully engaged in warfare with Reform about what counts as a good Brexit.  And therefore have less spare firepower to turn on him.

Those calculations may be sound.  However, that is not a reason for rejoiners to go quiet and wait on events. Those events may keep Starmer spooked indefinitely, and we need to create a counter-pressure against his natural caution. This pressure would need to be long-term, as the process of reconnecting with Europe is probably going to be a slow one. And it would need to be focused, with clear priorities.

There is a rationale for keeping our focus on Youth Free Movement in general, and Erasmus in particular. They should have priority in any campaigning for rejoin, for the following reason:

One of the strongest cards in the brexiteers hand throughout their long campaign, was the fact that British people identify less with Europe, on average, than do most other Europeans. Several surveys have shown over the years that European-ness constituted a fairly small part of the average Britons sense of identity. This meant that commitment to EU membership always tended to be shallower, more conditional than is the case for other Europeans.  This gave leverage to the brexiteers, and we have all suffered the consequences. In the long run this could get worse, with a vicious circle of ongoing Brexit isolation producing an even more insular nation. That would be bad for all of us.

In moving the country back toward Europe, we need to invest in a long-term cultural shift toward a stronger European identity, making Britain a stronger and more stable part of the European family. And we need to focus on is the younger generation. The more positive contact they have with other Europeans, the more European they are likely to become in their outlook. This would include travel, study and perhaps work in Europe, and also contact with Europeans doing the same in the UK. The more that contact happens, the more European the younger generation will become.

There are many routes along which we can work to build better and closer relations with Europe. But each of those needs realistic timing. Erasmus and Youth Free Movement have two time-scales, one to start the process and one to accrue their benefits. Those benefits will take decades to fully accrue, but will constitute a crucial change in our culture. But the process needs to start as soon as possible, and that requires a clear message to Starmer that there is a major constituency for this move. We need to show that we will support him if he finds the courage to stand up to the brexiteers. And we will challenge him if he doesn’t.

Stephen Wilmot  

What do we Europhiles actually value about Europe and the EU? What makes it worth our while to  campaign for rejoin?  I guess there are many answers to that question. For some its the economic benefit; for others the peace and security; not to forget the culture and history, the idealism and humanity, the beautiful cities, the good railways, the flexible and fair systems of voter representation. (Sometimes).  What’s more, every part of Europe has distinctive features that have their own special drawing power. French sophistication and sense of history; Dutch and Scandinavian open-ness, German fairness and generosity. And the other regions- the Mediterranean countries, the Visegrad countries – so courageously transcending their difficult histories. All these, I’m sure, exercise different degrees of attraction depending on who we are.

Since 2016 the grass has looked distinctly greener over the channel. in comparison to Britain, Europe’s politics have appeared civilized, humane and adult, and European societies ( not all but many) have looked prosperous, efficient and rational,  unlike the chaotic  mess that has been the UK. I’m aware that over those years I have created an idealized picture of a kinder, gentler social democratic Europe, shimmering tantalizingly out of reach across the channel while we suffered the miseries of Johnson and Truss.

Since 2016 many of us have felt stranded and exiled. Certainly for me, separation-anxiety from Europe and hostility to the Tory government became closely entangled in my mind.

Now the Tories have gone, it’s maybe time for me to do some mental disentangling; to decide how much my Europhilia reflects a positive commitment to a vision of Europe; and how far it reflects a revulsion from aforementioned Johnson and Truss. The latter are now gone, and the feeling of how it is to be British has been transformed. I’m suddenly aware that some of the emotions that I thought were pro-Europe were actually anti-conservative. I’m aware also that I need to rebalance my commitment to Europe in a way that is more rational and realistic.

First, though, what would be a rational and realistic take on the new UK government? Clearly they have a very different pedigree from the toxic heritage of the Tories. Starmer and Lammy are cautious about what they say on Europe, but we know that at heart they are remainers.  However, It is unclear how far they will be able or willing to go in reversing, or even modifying Brexit. They look over their shoulders at the red wall, the Brexit press,and Reform. And the EU is well aware that the right wing of UK politics is now thoroughly steeped in Brexit ideology, and, unfortunately, that they will return to power in due course, determined to wreck any reconnection with the EU.

And what about my rational and realistic take on the EU? I know that my view of European politics has been distorted by the Brexit experience and that in reality Europe was never really a centre-left domain. The European centre-right has always been strong, and we need look no further than the long dominance of Angela Merkel to see the embodiment of that. As to European politics being civilized, humane and adult; yes, so far I think I’ll stand by that; though with some exceptions.  

But now, realism and rationality present us with yet another challenge. Perfectly timed with our election result, we have the surge of the European far right. This has been brewing for some time, in Hungary, Poland, Italy, Slovakia, Sweden; and now it has come through strongly in the European elections, and specifically in national elections in our nearest neighbours, France and Holland.

 

It’s a reminder that Europe’s politics are complicated. Its also a good time to remember that the roots of the EU are themselves complex, representing several ideological strands. Alongside the social democratic strand of, for instance, Jaques Delors (Mrs Thatcher’s particular hate) there is also a strand of Catholic conservatism carrying a vision of Europe as a Christian stronghold, even as a reincarnation of Charlemagne’s empire. The late Robert Schuman, one of the founding fathers, was a Christian democrat with deep religious commitment, who is at present on his way to canonization. He was for a time a member of the Vichy government. So its a complicated ancestry.  The populist movements that have made such progress recently are not an alien growth. They have deep roots in European politics.

So its important that we centre-left Europhiles on this side of the channel re-accustom ourselves to the real politics of Europe. There is a danger that arrival of the new Labour government  and the advance of the European right will combine to weaken the rejoin project. After all, why entangle ourselves with a bunch of populists over the channel now that the conservatives are off our backs? Shouldn’t we maybe settle for the status quo? However, that would be to abandon realism and rationality just when we need it most. We need Europe, warts and all. The economic arguments for EU membership haven’t changed, and that includes the Brexit heritage of a 4% annual growth deficit that needs to be made good. And now more than ever there is security. If, as seems increasingly likely, Trump wins in November, the US will become much less interested in defending Europe, and we’ll have to step up ourselves. Our relationships with the rest of Europe, and specifically with the EU, become a matter of survival. It won’t be straightforward, because some of the European far right are ambivalent about security priorities, with elements of pro-Putin sentiment in some countries. We will need to re-engage with Europe’s complicated politics to put our weight where it is needed. First steps on the long road back.
 

 

 

 

 

 

Stephen Wilmot