In March tis year London Mayor Sadiq Khan publicly advocated that the UK should rejoin the EU. His remarks were unusually explicit, when compared to other senior office-holding Labour politicians, most of whom had hitherto been muted and cautious on the EU. He has repeated his argument since, and has started a trend, now led by Wes Streeting and echoed cautiously by Andy Burnham. But Khan made the first move. And it was yet another significant shift within the inner circle of Labour politics, and British politics generally. The Elephant in the room is getting plenty of air-time now. However Khan’s remarks also remind us of another feature of the Brexit story. In the referendum of 2016 the Brexit vote was concentrated in medium-to-small English towns, and in rural England; the traditional anglocentric heart of the UK. The remain vote was differently distributed. Scotland and Northern Ireland voted remain, as did two western Welsh-speaking counties of Wales. And several of England’s larger cities voted likewise. So some remain strongholds could be seen as peripheral in an anglocentric version of the UK. Scotland, Northern Ireland and west Wales are ‘celtic fringe’ (no disrespect) , and for Scotland and Northern Ireland their ‘fringeness’ to the English core was both highlighted and intensified by the referendum vote, leading to more independence-talk in Scotland, and a some real uncoupling in Northern Ireland, which has remained within the EU internal market.
However the big cities of England are not peripheral, least of all London. Despite that, some right-wing commentators have tried to argue that London is in some way not quite British. It is ‘Londonistan’. Certainly it is more ethnically diverse than most of the UK (though a few other cities are just as diverse). And that’s one way of ‘othering’ it, but its isn’t the only way. The importance of the square mile of the City of London, together with the general concentration of financial institutions there, means that London has an economy which is distinct from the rest of the country, much more closely networked in to the outside world. It has been referred to as a ‘city-state’ as if it were a separate political entity. And yet one of the most important features of the UK economy is its huge reliance on London, particularly on those same financial institutions. Without the city, we would be a much poorer country. So, far from being peripheral, it is the engine of the UK economy. And London is largely pro-Europe. Khan is speaking for his city in arguing for rejoin. So can London lead us back into Europe?
London was outvoted in the 2016 referendum, and its economic dominance probably fed the resentment of the left-behind towns of ‘core’ England that fired up the Brexit vote. The Brexit constituency has diminished over the past two years and is now very much a minority. But it’s a big minority, and its still in the same places that it dominated in 2016. Hardcore Brexiters are still very much with us, and have found a political home in Reform UK, which may well be part or all of the next UK government in (or before) 2029. We know from the Brexit years of 2016-20 that a pro-Brexit government that is sufficiently determined can face down restive remainers, even when those remainers control national or local governments. Nicola Sturgeon’s experience made that clear. Brexit means Brexit.
If he becomes Prime Minister, Farage will argue that he has a mandate to preserve and strengthen Brexit, notwithstanding a clear majority in the country that no longer wants it. Our constitution gives him that power, and he’ll use it. In 2016-20 the remainers put a brave face on it, but they knew that there was a (small) majority for Brexit in the referendum. That majority has now turned into a minority and Farage would not dare hold another referendum. Swinney, O’Neill, Khan and the mayors of the other remainer cities all know that and they would be surely emboldened by it. But what could they do?
Local and city governments in the UK can’t conduct their own foreign policy. The Scottish government is no better off than any local council in that respect. The exception to all of that is of course the Northern Ireland government which has a ready-made link to the EU through the Irish government, under the good Friday agreement. So they would have a lot more leeway. But they are unique. For everyone else its pretty unpromising. What could they do?
There are some things they could do. First off, they could combine. An association of pro-Europe governments at city and local levels could be created. Its not clear how far the Scottish government would want to be involved in that enterprise, but they could certainly associate themselves with it. London would hopefully play a leading role. The UK government would have no legal or constitutional basis for prohibiting this. And apart from London and the other cities, there are also smaller communities that aspire to a closer connection to Europe. One example I happen to know about is Beverley in East Yorkshire, which has joined a modern version of the Hanseatic league, an association of European towns with common interests. That is one kind of linkage, but there are undoubtedly other kinds also. Towns that had a remain majority in 2016 and still have an European identity could well get on board with a pro-Europe association of local authorities.
It might be possible also to link up with other pro-Europe organisations. Businesses, educational institutions and other bodies could come on board. The European Movement would, one hopes, play a role in this, maybe more as agitator and cheerleader than as organiser. A hostile Reform government would try to limit the freedom of public bodies in this coalition, so money would certainly be withheld, and local authority initiatives would be restricted to those areas where they can act without the explicit approval of the central government. That’s pretty restrictive. But it might allow more cultural and educational networking with Europe. Universities could do more, and business and voluntary bodies could do more still. One way or another a significant coalition of organizations could be put together. They would not need to be bound in detail to a common programme, as long as there is a shared general direction of travel. And for a five-year term of a Reform government, some real momentum could be kept up. That would need political skill, risk-taking, bargaining and compromise. In many ways it would be good if this attracted ambitious politicians; but that would also involve risks, and leadership would probably be better staying with those who don’t have parliamentary aspirations. However, energetic political entrepreneurs would certainly be needed.
If this starts to work, its likely that a Reform government would try to impose more restrictions on its activities. But that might actually produce some political rewards to the Euro-coalition. If Reform were provoked into legislating to restrict contact with the EU, that might open the way for a lively political campaign, possibly allowing the pro-Europeans to mobilize wider support. The Reform government might find itself in a cleft stick in that event. If they don’t do anything to restrict the pro-Europeans, the Brexit media will scream blue murder. So maybe we can give them a real headache.
Then again; that looks risky. It might be wiser to avoid confrontation, to move quietly and build a network without attracting too much attention. Its possible that Reform will turn out to be a competent government, and may win a second term. In which case we need to focus on developing a pro-Europe network that is deeply embedded in the more receptive parts of the state system and civil society, that can keep up its work for the long term. The Brexiters played a long game in the years leading up to the 2016 referendum. We may well need to do the same.
derby4europe 