Tag: history

2024 in Retrospect

by stephenwilmot1, posted in Blog, National Events

The 2024 election was a turning-point in the post-Brexit recuperation, but it has taken two years to properly understand its significance. Now it feels like we’ve finally got to a point where we can revisit 2024 with a clearer perspective, and nail down what changed as a result of the election. However, to do that we need to go back to the beginning; to 2016 and the Brexit referendum.

For remainers the referendum outcome was a shock. It was far worse than a disappointing election result, where we find that the ‘other lot’ have won, and we hope for a better result next time. The referendum was not like that. There would be no ‘next time’. The change was forever, and the winners- the ‘other lot’ – were a very different lot from those we had learned to live with.  The referendum result triggered a slow coup d’etat, as the brexiteers took control of government and parliament.  Theresa May wasn’t really one of them,  she was ambivalent about Brexit, so she had to look fierce to ride the tiger. But when Johnson took over in 2019 he injected real poison into the process. He purged the conservative party of remainers, and picked fights with the EU whenever he could. His government was intentionally and performatively hostile to Europe; and by extension, hostile to anyone who saw themselves as European. It brought home to us that there would be no replay for this match. In retrospect the pre-Brexit years started to look (to quote A E Housman) like a ‘land of lost content’.

 So how did remainers deal with this, out here in the provinces? We found small ways to push back, and we found other people who were pushing back also. But we felt very thin on the ground. Some of the big pre-referendum remainer voices went quiet after the referendum, maybe ‘respecting the decision’ in some cases, and in other cases maybe just giving up. Nonetheless others fought on, nationally and locally. We worked hard to keep our spirits up, to keep a sense of agency, to oppose the Brexit government, oppose hard Brexit, oppose the petty enmities that the brexiteers engineered; just keep opposing, and keep together. The pre-Brexit years were increasingly a distant memory.

The Labour victory in 2024 ended the hostility and relieved much of the pain. Suddenly there was hope; a change of direction, a movement back toward Europe, and a feeling that rejoin was again a rational goal, not just nostalgia. All kinds of reconnections and co-operations were on the table. We started to experience again the feeling of European-ness; of being part of a bigger society that is congenial and familiar. It was great, for a while. But Labour’s arrival in power also made the process of coping much more complicated. Our  ‘land of lost content’, visible again from a distance, nonetheless  retreated like a mirage as we tried to approach it. Instead we had the hard business of negotiation, by a government that was clearly pro-European, but clearly also terrified of angering the brexiteers. Starmer backed carefully toward Europe, to ‘make Brexit work’.  It was a slow process.

Then, this summer, nearly 2 years on from the election, the 10th anniversary of the referendum arrived. And, as often with anniversaries, lots of buried memories started to surface; in particular, memories of our original joining of the EU in 1973. We were reminded that it had all been highly contingent. There was never anything natural, inevitable, predestined about coming into the EU. It might never have happened, just as the referendum and Brexit might never have happened.

For those of us who had lived decades in the EU, the first instinct was  restoration; put history into reverse and go back to how things were. But if we look back dispassionately, its clear that restoration is impossible. The UK’s membership of the EU was built on an rickety  edifice of concessions and exceptions; the Wilson renegotiation;  the  Thatcher rebate; the decision to stay outside the Euro; the decision to stay out of the Schengen zone; the decision to stay out of the Social Chapter. And for a while we got away with it. We were truly in a privileged position, enjoying a bespoke niche that was carved out of the EU’s rules with a combination of diplomatic finesse and bloody-minded obduracy. It reflected the UK’s clout and credibility, and it fed into Tony Blair’s confident (but perhaps vacuous) rhetoric about being at the heart of Europe. We were in a sweet spot.

But it has been increasingly clear since Labour came into power that the prospect of regaining that sweet spot is vanishingly small. With the best will in the world on the part of the Labour government, the specific circumstances that gave us those concessions are not going to happen again. In any case we are damaged goods, with a wobbling economy, hollowed out public finances, a run of weak, thwarted prime ministers; and, above all, Brexit.  No more exceptions for us.

So what do we do? forget about exceptionalism and go back in without concessions? Go into the Eurozone, go into Schengen, and the rest of it?  The UK could prosper in that.  And it might be the only deal on offer from the EU.

 But persuading the British people of that would be quite another matter. Public resistance to the prospect of losing the pound was very strong at the time the Euro was introduced, and that resistance was strengthened by the experience of watching the Eurozone struggle with the financial crisis of 2011. It looked very much then as if the Euro would fail. And that has not been forgotten. That same public resistance to entering the Eurozone is likely to be as strong as ever if we go back in.

But, unfortunately, Europeans don’t have much reason to empathise with our sensibilities about sterling. For many in Europe the historical experience of national currencies was very mixed. Germany’s collective memory of 1920s inflation is a nightmare. France also had to make a fresh start with the Franc in 1960; and for eastern European countries the experience of soviet control of their currencies was not a happy one. So the depth of attachment to national currencies is variable. In the end most Europeans were able to walk away from their own, and learn to live with the Euro. I think they will expect us to do the same.

Entering the Schengen zone will also stir the most atavistic terrors of foreign invasion, and they probably don’t need to be elaborated here. All in all attempting to re-enter the EU on those terms would be a gift to Reform and to the Tories, and would almost certainly bring electoral disaster for pro-European parties. So we seem to be out of options.

But there may be other ways of re-entering Europe. Looking at the bigger picture, the Russian threat has developed steadily throughout the past two decades, and the deterioration in the behaviour of the US has been a problem for the EU, the UK, Canada and some important Latin American and Asian countries. Mark Carney is working to build a network of middle-ranking powers to counterbalance the bullying of the US, Russia and China. That is bringing Canada closer to the EU. There is already a Canada/EU trade treaty, and the dynamic at present must be toward further convergence, both in trade and in security. Canada is in many ways more European than the US, with its dual British/French heritage and its parliamentary system. The fit would seem to be a good one.

And what about Turkey? That isn’t such an obvious friend. It has clearly turned eastward in geopolitical terms in recent years, but that could change. Turkey has its own distinctive western heritage, despite current politics. There has been talk for decades about a two-speed Europe, (or three-speed if we include the EEA) and it is perfectly imaginable that several countries, like Canada and Turkey, could move closer to the EU, making up a looser grouping with the EU as fulcrum.  The EU would gain a good deal in security terms from a circle of allies. And it would provide a framework for the UK to move closer in to the EU.

That’s probably as near to a sweet spot as we can get. For the sake of our security we need reliable European allies, and that means serious investment in European security by the UK. For the sake of our economy we need to get better access to our nearest markets, and that means achieving closer links with the Single Market and/or the Customs Union. For the sake of forthcoming generations we need to have a closer cultural relationship with Europe, and that means going back into Erasmus plus. Under present circumstances much of that would involve us being a rule-taker rather than a rule-maker, as we are endlessly reminded.  But if we go in as part of the larger alignment I’ve just outlined, maybe the process could be a little different. It might be easier for the core EU to compromise with the new ‘outer circle’ so that the rule-maker/rule-taker dichotomy is modified, and a new kind of relationship is forged. That won’t be the land of lost content, but it could be a sweet spot.

Sadiq Khan and the long term

by stephenwilmot1, posted in Blog, National Events

In March tis year London Mayor Sadiq Khan publicly advocated that the UK should  rejoin the EU.  His remarks were unusually explicit, when compared to other senior office-holding Labour politicians, most of whom had hitherto been muted and cautious on the EU. He has repeated  his argument since, and has started a trend, now led by Wes Streeting and echoed cautiously by Andy Burnham. But Khan made the first move. And it was yet another significant shift within the inner circle of Labour politics, and British politics generally. The Elephant in the room is getting plenty of air-time now. However Khan’s remarks also remind us of another feature of the Brexit story. In the referendum of 2016 the Brexit vote was concentrated in medium-to-small English towns, and in rural England; the traditional anglocentric heart of the UK. The remain vote was differently distributed.  Scotland and Northern Ireland voted remain, as did two western Welsh-speaking counties of Wales. And several of England’s larger cities voted likewise. So some remain strongholds could be seen as peripheral in an anglocentric version of the UK. Scotland, Northern Ireland and west Wales are ‘celtic fringe’ (no disrespect) , and for Scotland and Northern Ireland their ‘fringeness’ to the English core was both highlighted and intensified by the referendum vote, leading to more independence-talk in Scotland, and a some real uncoupling in Northern Ireland, which has remained within the EU internal market.

However the big cities of England are not peripheral, least of all London. Despite that, some right-wing commentators have tried to argue that London is in some way not quite British. It is ‘Londonistan’. Certainly it is more ethnically diverse than most of the UK (though a few other cities are just as diverse). And that’s one way of ‘othering’ it, but its isn’t the only way.  The importance of the square mile of the City of London, together with the general concentration of financial institutions there, means that London has an economy which is distinct from the rest of the country, much more closely networked in to the outside world. It has been referred to as a ‘city-state’ as if it were a separate political entity. And yet one of the most important features of the UK economy is its huge reliance on London, particularly on those same financial institutions. Without the city, we would be a much poorer country.  So, far from being peripheral, it is the engine of the UK economy. And London is largely pro-Europe. Khan is speaking for his city in arguing for rejoin. So can London lead us back into Europe?

London was outvoted in the 2016 referendum, and its economic dominance probably fed the resentment of the left-behind towns of ‘core’ England that fired up the Brexit vote. The Brexit constituency has diminished over the past two years and is now very much a minority. But it’s a big minority, and its still in the same places that it dominated in 2016. Hardcore Brexiters are still very much with us, and have found a political home in Reform UK, which may well be part or all of the next UK government in (or before) 2029. We know from the Brexit years of 2016-20 that a pro-Brexit government that is sufficiently determined can face down restive remainers, even when those remainers control national or local governments. Nicola Sturgeon’s experience made that clear. Brexit means Brexit.

 If he becomes Prime Minister, Farage will argue that he has a mandate to preserve and strengthen Brexit, notwithstanding a clear majority in the country that no longer wants it. Our constitution gives him that power, and he’ll use it. In 2016-20 the remainers put a brave face on it, but they knew that there was a (small) majority for Brexit in the referendum. That majority has now turned into a minority and Farage would not dare hold another referendum. Swinney, O’Neill, Khan and the mayors of the other remainer cities all know that and they would be surely emboldened by it. But what could they do?  

Local and city governments in the UK can’t conduct their own foreign policy. The Scottish government is no better off than any local council in that respect. The exception to all of that is of course the Northern Ireland government which has a ready-made link to the EU through the Irish government, under the good Friday agreement. So they would have a lot more leeway. But they are unique. For everyone else its pretty unpromising. What could they do?

There are some things they could do. First off, they could combine. An association of pro-Europe governments at city and local levels could be created. Its not clear how far the Scottish government would want to be involved in that enterprise, but they could certainly associate themselves with it. London would hopefully play a leading role. The UK government would have no legal or constitutional basis for prohibiting this. And apart from London and the other cities, there are also smaller communities that aspire to a closer connection to Europe. One example I happen to know about is Beverley in East Yorkshire, which has joined a modern version of the Hanseatic league, an association of European towns with common interests. That is one kind of linkage, but there are undoubtedly other kinds also. Towns that had a remain majority in 2016 and still have an European identity could well get on board with a pro-Europe association of local authorities.

It might be possible also to link up with other pro-Europe organisations. Businesses, educational institutions and other bodies  could come on board. The European Movement would, one hopes, play a role in this, maybe more as agitator and cheerleader than as organiser. A hostile Reform government would try to limit the freedom of public bodies in this coalition, so money would certainly be withheld, and local authority initiatives would be restricted to those areas where they can act without the explicit approval of the central government. That’s pretty restrictive. But it might allow more cultural and educational networking with Europe. Universities could do more, and business and voluntary bodies could do more still. One way or another a significant coalition of organizations could be put together. They would not need to be bound in detail to a common programme, as long as there is a shared general direction of travel. And for a five-year term of a Reform government, some real momentum could be kept up. That would need political skill, risk-taking, bargaining and compromise. In many ways it would be good if this attracted ambitious politicians; but that would also involve risks, and leadership would probably be better staying with those who don’t have parliamentary aspirations. However, energetic political entrepreneurs would certainly be needed.

If this starts to work, its likely that a Reform government would try to impose more restrictions on its activities. But that might actually produce some political rewards to the Euro-coalition.  If Reform were provoked into legislating to restrict contact with the EU, that might open the way for a lively political campaign, possibly allowing the pro-Europeans to mobilize wider support. The Reform government might find itself in a cleft stick in that event. If they don’t do anything to restrict the pro-Europeans, the Brexit media will scream blue murder. So maybe we can give them a real headache.

Then again; that looks risky.  It might be wiser to avoid confrontation, to move quietly and build a network without attracting too much attention. Its  possible that Reform will turn out to be a competent government, and may win a second term. In which case we need to focus on developing a pro-Europe network that is deeply embedded in the more receptive parts of the state system and civil society, that can keep up its work for the long term. The Brexiters played a long game in the years leading up to the 2016 referendum. We may well need to do the same. 

A view on UK-EU Convergence: House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Report March 2026

by stephenwilmot1, posted in Blog, National Events

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons (Chair: Emily Thornberry MP) published its latest report a couple of weeks ago. This one focuses on the developing relationship between the UK and the EU since July 2024.  Title:

‘From a Common Understanding to Common Ground: Building a UK-EU: Strategic Partnership fit for the future.’

The report provides a useful overview of UK re-engagement with Europe. It gives a clear account of the UK-EU summit last May and of the ‘Common Understanding’  document that came out of it. It summarizes what has been done so far in terms of defence, Erasmus, agri-food, carbon pricing, electricity trading and youth mobility. It points out the present stalled state of the SAFE negotiations (which were attempting to include the UK in EU arms procurement), and it recommends that these be resumed and pursued with vigour.

The committee also identifies the weaknesses in the government’s approach. Specifically it charges the government with a lack of transparency, consistency and overall vision with regard to convergence. The picture it presents is of an unco-ordinated series of pushes which, while all pointing toward closer engagement with Europe, nonetheless don’t amount to a coherent joined-up strategy. The tone of the report is a good deal more sober than that of government pronouncements, and it’s a useful antidote to government hype.

However, the Committee doesn’t just criticize. It goes on to make recommendations. In particular it advocates a more strategic joined-up approach to the re-engagement process by the UK government, with more political dialogue on strategic matters, and a ‘coherent, ambitious’ economic agenda. It also wants the Government to produce an EU White Paper with ‘coherent vision for future’. Finally it recommends the creation of a Commons Committee dedicated to the relationship with the EU. 

The tone of the report suggests that the committee’s centre of gravity is pro-Europe, though not specifically pro-rejoin. That distinction probably partly reflects the fact that the committee includes two Conservative MPs (as well as two Liberal Democrats) alongside seven Labour MPs. The two Tories are John Whittingdale, who is a long-time Brexit hardliner, and Aphra Brandreth, who is a member of the 2024 intake and was presumably selected as a candidate in accordance with Boris Johnson’s purge of remainers. So I guess neither of them would have agreed to anything explicit with regard to rejoin, and actually I’m surprised they agreed to the pro-convergence tone of the report at all. The bipartisan feel of it may be a façade, or it may represent something deeper. Who knows?